The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The court below determined that the plaintiff made a confession by making a complaint on the first date for pleading after clearly expressing that the plaintiff agreed on the quantity and supply price of the Domination of government procurement jointly with other manufacturers of avian influenza (hereinafter “Domination”) from 2005 to 2007 in the cause of the claim of the complaint of this case (hereinafter “Domination”), and that the plaintiff made a confession by making a complaint on the first date for pleading, and that the above agreement was recognized by the evidence as stated in its reasoning. The court below found that according to such confession and the facts of recognition, the plaintiff was recognized to have committed the collaborative act of this case by the above agreement.

2. However, this decision of the court below is not acceptable for the following reasons.

A confession under Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act applied mutatis mutandis by Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act is limited to a statement about facts, and a statement that recognizes a legal relationship or legal effect which is the premise of a subject matter of a lawsuit is so-called a so-called right confession, and the parties may freely withdraw the confession

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Da6024, Jun. 10, 2010). According to the records, the Plaintiff’s legal representative was an agreement on the quantity allocation or price of the self-financing of government procurement in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively, and there was a separate collaborative act.

“A complaint stating its purport was stated on the first date for pleading, but later, it was found that the Plaintiff changed the above argument without any unfair collaborative act that agreed and implemented in advance the quantity and supply price of the softs ordered by the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Examining these circumstances and the contents of the Plaintiff’s assertion in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, a series of acts conducted by the Plaintiff, including the Plaintiff, in 2005 to 2007, with respect to the so-called “self-defense” manufacturers are subject to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act.