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The judgment below
Of them, the part on Defendant B shall be reversed.
Defendant
B The crime of the 2018 Godan71 case in the holding of the court below.
Reasons
1. The summary of the grounds for appeal against the Defendants is too unreasonable (one year of imprisonment, three years of probation, probation, community service order 270 hours, Defendant B: one year of imprisonment with prison labor, and eight months of imprisonment with prison labor with prison labor for the crimes of the 2018 Go-Ma1493 Case as stated in the judgment of the court below).
2. Determination
A. In light of the fact that the sentencing of Defendant A is made within a reasonable and appropriate scope based on the statutory penalty, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, as well as the fact that the sentencing is made within the discretionary scope, and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing of the first instance court in a case where there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment and refrain from imposing a sentence without any difference from the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the sentence differs from the appellate court’s view (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). Defendant A did not have any particular change in the sentencing conditions compared with the lower court’s failure to submit new materials on sentencing at the first instance court, and there are no reasonable grounds for the lower court’s argument in the following the Defendant A’s grounds for sentencing.
B. We examine the judgment on the assertion of unfair sentencing by Defendant B, and the fact that Defendant B had several capabilities of punishment for the same kind and a different kind of crime, as well as the same crime.