1. All appeals filed by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) against the instant principal lawsuit and counterclaim are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be the principal lawsuit.

1. The reasoning for the court’s explanation of this case is as follows: (a) the first instance court’s reasoning for accepting the instant case is as stated in the first instance court’s judgment, except that the second instance court’s “not later than December 23, 2009,” which read “not later than September 23, 2013,” and the second instance’s “not later than September 23, 2013,” and thus, it is identical to the entry of the first instance court’s judgment under the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. First of all, we examine the Plaintiff’s claim for damages on the Plaintiff’s primary main claim, even if the Defendant, even if having agreed at the time of completion that the lease was made by changing the purpose of the above 105 and 106 to the J Research Institute, each of the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to readily conclude that the Plaintiff decreased the Plaintiff’s sales due to the Defendant’s nonperformance of obligation as the J Research Institute occupant, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise (it may be deemed that the Plaintiff’s claim for damages on the Plaintiff’s primary main claim seeking damages on the property, which was lost due to a large-scale sign-up store, due to the Plaintiff’s failure to recover the Plaintiff’s sales reduction due to the large-scale store store occupant prior to the establishment of the J Research Institute).

In addition, the plaintiff's conjunctive claim is examined as to the plaintiff's conjunctive claim, and in case where property damage occurs due to non-performance of contractual obligation, the contract party's mental suffering shall be deemed to have been recovered from the compensation for property damage. Thus, there are special circumstances that the compensation for property damage has inflicted an irrecoverable mental suffering, and only where the other party knew or could have known such circumstances, the consolation money for mental suffering may be recognized (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Da5979, Dec. 13, 1994; 2002Da53865, Nov. 12, 2004; 2005Da213, Mar. 24, 2005); and