logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 부산고등법원 2015.07.22 2014노13 (1)
특수공무집행방해치상등
Text

The judgment below

Part concerning Defendant G and AC shall be reversed.

Defendant

G and AC shall be punished by imprisonment for two years.

(b).

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant B, G, AC 1) misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles ) Defendant B, G, and AC’s obstruction of business

(a).

(c).

(f) the Corporation;

(1) (1) According to the purport of the Supreme Court’s decision, the said Defendants were a person who worked for more than two years during the illegal dispatch process, and is a modern automobile company (hereinafter “on-site automobile”).

(2) Although the above Defendants are in the position of workers and have the right to enter the workplace for trade union activities, they also have the right to enter the workplace for trade union activities, even if the above Defendants cannot recognize the status of workers of modern automobiles, since they were in the process of filing an application for unfair dismissal relief, the said Defendants also have the right to enter the workplace for trade union activities. However, it is unreasonable for Hyundai Motor to block the Defendants’ attempt to enter the above Defendants in the position as a physical force and do not constitute a duty worthy of protection under the Criminal Act, and thus, the act of the said Defendants, which resisted the unfair control of modern Motor Vehicle, does not constitute the element of the crime of interference with business. (2) Hyundai Motor prevented the Defendants from attempting to enter the above Defendants while disregarding the administrative guidance of the Ministry of Labor, and the said Defendants exercised their power in the process of resisting the unfair measures of modern Motor Vehicle. (b) Since the above Defendants’ act constitutes a legitimate act, it constitutes a violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act (Article 2 of the lower judgment).

Therefore, the assembly of this case does not constitute a contingent assembly which has the obligation to report in advance as stipulated in the Assembly and Demonstration Act.

C. Defendant G.

arrow