The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

The gist of the grounds for appeal is that there was no fact of intimidation by the Defendant, and there was no intention of intimidation, and the victim cannot be deemed to have been sworn due to the Defendant’s act.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below which found the defendant guilty of the facts charged of this case is erroneous.

2. Determination

A. The relevant legal doctrine’s “Intimidation” generally notifies a person who has become the other party of any harm sufficient to arouse fear, and whether it constitutes a threat of harm or injury ought to be determined by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances before and after the act, such as the offender’s tendency and the other party’s surrounding circumstances at the time of such notice, the relationship between the offender and the other party, and the degree of friendship.

(See Supreme Court Decision 201Do10451 Decided August 17, 2012 (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Do10451, Aug. 17, 2012). In addition, an intentional constituent element of a subjective constituent element does not require an offender’s awareness of and citing that the offender is aware of such a degree of harm and injury, and the intent or desire to actually realize the harm that was notified. However, if the perpetrator’s speech and behavior is merely a mere emotional expression or temporary dispersion, and it is objectively evident that the perpetrator has no intent of intimidation in light of the surrounding circumstances, the intent of intimidation or intimidation cannot be acknowledged, but whether there was a intent of intimidation or intimidation should be determined by comprehensively taking into account not only the external appearance of the act, but also surrounding circumstances, such as the background leading

(See Supreme Court Decision 90Do2102 delivered on May 10, 1991, etc.). B.

In full view of the following circumstances admitted by the evidence duly admitted and investigated by the lower court, the lower court: (a) the Defendant driven the log, which is a dangerous object, accessed the victim; and (b) threatened the victim by means of flaging the wall by inserting the log.