The judgment of the court below is reversed.

Defendant

A A A Fines for a violation of the Act on Entrusted Elections, such as public organizations, etc.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. As to Defendant A1’s violation of the Personal Information Protection Act, the electoral registry and the register of union members are separate and not identical. In a case where prior consent was obtained from the subject of personal information, as well as where consent was obtained or presumed consent was obtained after the fact, it should be deemed that “a separate consent was obtained.”

B) In relation to a violation of the Act on Entrusted Elections by Public Organizations, Etc. (hereinafter “violation of the Act on Entrusted Elections”), it is necessary to interpret Article 24(1) of the former Act on Entrusted Elections by Public Organizations, Etc. (amended by Presidential Decree No. 2420, Dec. 24, 2015; hereinafter “former Act on Entrusted Elections”) as a restrictive interpretation that a person who became final and conclusive as the elector of an election for the president of a cooperative cannot engage in an election campaign. The electoral register of this case was finalized on March 1, 2015. The evidence alone of the lower judgment alone cannot be seen as having known whether B conducted an election campaign after the said final and conclusive date, and thus, the lower judgment convicting the Defendant shall be reversed.

2) The sentence of the lower court (one million won in penalty, and a fine of three hundred thousand won in penalty) that is unfair in sentencing is too unreasonable.

B. In relation to the violation of the Personal Information Protection Act, Defendant B (A) did not know that the list of union members issued by A was created on the basis of the electoral registry. Since there was no profit-making or illegal purpose, it does not constitute “third party who received personal information” under the Personal Information Protection Act.

B) The foregoing paragraph (a)(1)(b) is the same as the previous paragraph.

2) The sentence of the lower court (an amount of KRW 700,000) that is unfair in sentencing is too unreasonable.

(c)

The prosecutor's (unfair sentencing) sentence of the lower court is too uncomfortable and unfair.

2. Determination

A. We examine the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court as to the Defendants’ misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal doctrine by comparing the circumstances stated by the lower court with the records.