The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Ulsan District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The main sentence of Article 37 (4) of the Food Sanitation Act provides that a person who intends to engage in a business prescribed by Presidential Decree shall report to the competent authority by type of business or place of business, as prescribed by Presidential Decree;

Accordingly, Article 25 (1) 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Food Sanitation Act provides for "food transportation business under Article 21 (4) of the Enforcement Decree of the Food Sanitation Act" as one of the businesses subject to the above report.

In that sense, Article 21 subparag. 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Food Sanitation Act provides that "the business of transporting foods that are easily decomposed and deteriorated, such as fish, birds, and products processed therefrom, in a sanitary manner (hereinafter referred to as "food that is easily decomposed")," and Article 21 subparag. 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Food Sanitation Act excludes "the business of transporting foods for the purpose of sale at the place of business of the relevant business operator" and "the case of transporting foods manufactured and processed by the relevant business operator" from the food transportation business.

In full view of the language and text of the instant proviso, the legislative purport and purpose, and differences in facility standards for food sales business and food transportation business, etc., the term “transporting food for the purpose of sale at the relevant business entity’s place of business” in the instant proviso refers to cases where a business entity transports food that is easily decomposed to its place of business for the purpose of sale at its own place of business, and cannot be deemed as including cases where a business entity transports food that is easily decomposed to a buyer during the process of selling food that is easily decomposed (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do2477, Mar. 15, 2017). According to the reasoning of the first instance judgment and the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted, according to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the reasoning of the lower judgment, the Defendant is identical to the instant facts charged.