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(영문) 수원지방법원안양지원 2020.07.09 2019가단115080
공사대금
Text

1. The defendant shall pay 3,091,300 won to the plaintiff and 20% per annum from July 1, 2019 to the day of complete payment.

Reasons

Facts of recognition

On September 1, 2017, the Plaintiff subcontracted D construction work from the Defendant and completed the construction work around 2018.

On January 2, 2019, the Defendant paid the Plaintiff the total amount of KRW 33,091,300,000 to the Plaintiff, and the total amount of KRW 5,041,30,000 among which the Defendant agreed to pay KRW 5,00,000 until March 29, 2019, KRW 6,000 until April 28, 2019, KRW 17,050,000 until May 31, 2019, KRW 17,050 until June 30, 2019. If the Defendant delays the payment, the Defendant would lose the benefit of the period immediately, and the unpaid amount would be paid in addition to the interest rate of KRW 20 per annum from the day after the date of loss of the benefit of the period until the day of full payment (Evidence 1).

[Ground of recognition] According to the above facts of recognition as to Gap's evidence Nos. 1 through 4, Eul's evidence Nos. 1 through 6, and the purport of the whole pleadings, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff 3,091,300 won under the above payment agreement and damages for delay at the agreed interest rate of 20% per annum from July 1, 2019 to the day of full payment.

As to this, the defendant asserts to the effect that the payment certificate of construction cost (Evidence A No. 1) was made by the plaintiff's strong pressure to suspend the operation of construction work and all other matters unless it is prepared and notified, and thus, it is not effective. The plaintiff did not deliver the completion certificate and defect bond, so the defendant cannot pay the balance of construction.

In order to become null and void as a declaration of defective declaration of intention of a juristic act by duress, the degree of coercion is not limited to the degree of simply causing the other party to feel fear of illegal harm, but it should be limited to the degree that the declaration of intention was made in a state of completely deprived of the party's right to make a decision, and only the external form of the juristic act was made.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2002Da56031 delivered on December 10, 2002, etc.).

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