1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against plaintiffs A and B, which corresponds to the following amount ordered to be paid:

1. The court's explanation of this part of the basic facts is the same as the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance (Articles 3, 7, and 4, 8). Thus, the court's explanation of this part is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

(Provided, however, the part related only to the co-defendant Busan Metropolitan City of the first instance is excluded);

A. The Defendants asserted that they were the employer of the J, who did not perform their duty of protection or safety consideration for workers, and thereby died due to addiction to hydrogen hydrogen while the J was working at the instant wastewater treatment site. As such, the Defendants are liable to compensate for damages caused by the instant accident under either the duty of protection or the duty of safety consideration, or the tort liability for breach of the duty of safety consideration.

B. Defendant D’s assertion cannot be deemed as having died of being addicted to the hydrogen occurring in the instant wastewater treatment plant. The J is only an employee belonging to Defendant E, not an employee of Defendant D, and Defendant D took all necessary safety measures inside the workplace, etc., and thus, Defendant D is not liable for the instant accident, or even if liability is recognized, the responsibility should be considerably limited.

C. Defendant E’s assertion cannot be deemed as having died of being addicted to the hydrogen occurring in the instant wastewater treatment plant. Since Defendant D fully takes charge of duties instruction and management of wastewater treatment facilities with respect to J, Defendant E is not responsible for the instant accident, or his responsibility should be considerably limited to Defendant D.

Furthermore, among the damage claims sought by Plaintiff A and B, the part regarding the lost income between the age of 61 and the age of 65 among the damage claims sought by J was sought on December 29, 2015 only after the lapse of three years from December 3, 2015 when J died from December 29, 2015. As such, the extinctive prescription of the damage claims arising from tort has expired.