The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The lower court’s punishment (two months of imprisonment, two years of suspended sentence, 40 hours of an order to attend a sexual assault treatment course, and confiscation) against the accused against the summary of the grounds for appeal is deemed unreasonable.

2. It is reasonable to respect the prosecutor’s assertion of unfair sentencing in a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court’s determination of unfair sentencing, and the first instance court’s sentencing does not deviate from

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). Based on the foregoing legal doctrine, there is no change in the sentencing conditions compared to the lower court’s failure to submit new sentencing data in the trial, and the circumstances alleged by the prosecutor on the ground of unfair sentencing are deemed to have been reflected in the grounds for sentencing by the lower court. In full view of the following circumstances, the lower court’s sentencing is not deemed unfair because the lower court’s age, character and behavior, environment, motive and background of the crime, means and consequence of the crime, and circumstances after the crime were committed, etc., which are the conditions for sentencing specified in the instant records and arguments, including the following circumstances.

Therefore, the prosecutor's assertion of unfair sentencing is without merit.

3. The lower court, ex officio, found the Defendant guilty of both the crime of violating the Act on Special Cases concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes (Kameras, Use and Screening of Cameras, etc.) and the crime of intrusion upon residence in the judgment that is subject to registration, and sentenced to one imprisonment by deeming that each of the above crimes is a concurrent crime under the former part of

However, as Article 45(4) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes applies to this case, the court below omitted the registration period, even though it is necessary to additionally examine whether the registration period of personal information against the defendant is deemed unreasonable to be determined as the period prescribed in each subparagraph of paragraph (1) of the same Article.

Therefore, it is therefore.