The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The decision of the court below on the gist of the grounds of appeal (one year and six months of imprisonment, two years of suspended execution) is deemed to be too unhued and unfair.

2. Determination

A. In light of the fact that the sentencing takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory punishment, and the fact that the sentencing is determined after the appellate court’s ex post facto review nature, etc., it is reasonable to respect the first instance judgment in a case where there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance judgment, and the first instance sentencing does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Even though the first instance sentencing falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the difference between the appellate court’s opinion and the first instance judgment is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion, and to refrain from imposing a sentence without any difference between the first instance court and the first instance court (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). (b) In this case, the prosecutor did not submit new materials for sentencing at the first instance court to the victims and the Defendant’s opportunity to recover from the victim.

In full view of the factors revealed in the proceedings of the instant case, including the Defendant’s age, sex, environment, background of the crime, circumstances after the crime, etc., the sentencing of the lower court is too unhued and so it exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

Therefore, the prosecutor's assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor’s appeal is without merit and thus, pursuant to Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.