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1. The defendant completed the acquisition by prescription on November 9, 2003 with respect to each real estate listed in the separate sheet to the plaintiff.
Reasons
Facts of recognition
On November 9, 1983, B, the Plaintiff’s father, purchased each real estate listed in the annexed sheet (hereinafter “instant real estate”) immediately adjacent to the real estate (hereinafter “the instant real estate”), and occupied as dry field, orchard, orchard, etc., by purchasing 496 square meters and d previously 2,503 square meters, and opened possession of the instant real estate as part of dry field and orchard.
B, after 15-6 years from then, the Plaintiff was donated to the said land, etc. on December 26, 2001 and continued to occupy the real estate so far after the Plaintiff succeeded to the possession of the said land.
The instant real estate was registered as owned by the Defendant on December 31, 197 with its land category designated as the road, and was registered as owned by the Defendant on January 2, 2017, following a survey of the current status on January 2, 2017. The land category was changed as indicated in the attached list, and on March 22, 2013, the registration of ownership was made in the future
[Grounds for recognition] There is no dispute. According to Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 29 (including the number of branch numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul evidence Nos. 1 through 10, the fact inquiry results with respect to the head of the wife in Yong-si, and the appraiser E's appraisal results, and the overall purport of the pleading, the real estate of this case was completed on Nov. 9, 2003, when the real estate of this case was occupied in peace and openly and openly for 20 years or longer from the date of commencement of possession by Eul as the plaintiff's own intention.
Although the Defendant asserted that the instant real estate is an administrative property and is not subject to acquisition by prescription, the land category of the instant real estate was in the past road, the actual status was about dry field, orchard, farming house, and house site, etc., and it was the same as before B and the Plaintiff occupied. Therefore, the instant real estate cannot be deemed administrative property used for public use, such as road, etc., and the Defendant’s assertion is without merit.
Then, the defendant applies to the plaintiff.