The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Incheon District Court Panel Division.

We examine ex officio.

1. The crime for which a judgment to punish with imprisonment without prison labor or a heavier punishment has become final and conclusive and the crime for which a judgment has become final and conclusive prior to the final and conclusive judgment constitutes concurrent crimes stipulated in the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act. Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act provides that if there is a crime for which judgment has not been rendered among concurrent crimes, a sentence shall be imposed in consideration of equity

2. According to the records, the Defendant was sentenced to six months of imprisonment for a crime of fraud, etc. at the Seoul Central District Court on February 3, 2012, and the judgment became final and conclusive on May 25, 2012. On May 22, 2012, the Defendant was sentenced to three months of imprisonment for a crime of fraud, etc. on May 30, 2012, and the judgment became final and conclusive on May 30, 2012. Each of the instant crimes committed on July 10, 2011. Accordingly, each of the instant crimes and the instant crimes for which the judgment became final and conclusive are concurrent crimes under the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act.

Therefore, regarding the instant crime, the punishment should be determined in consideration of equity in the case where the instant crime and each of the above judgments have become final and conclusive at the same time, as seen earlier.

However, the records of this case are attached only to the case agreement assistant conference regarding the crime for which each of the above judgments has become final and conclusive, and further, there is no evidence of the trial by the court below through the judgment or the statement of the related person about what the specific contents of the crime were stated.

Therefore, the lower court cannot be deemed to have imposed a sentence pursuant to Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act on the instant crime, and the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the latter part of Articles 37 and 39(1) of the Criminal Act, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations.

3. Therefore, without examining the Defendant’s grounds of appeal on unreasonable sentencing, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.