208Gaz. 82808 Compensation (as referred to in this paragraph)

1. Maximum○○;

Dongjak-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government ○

2. Maximum○○.

Gangnam-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government ○

3. Maximum○○.

Dongjak-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government ○

4. Maximum○○.

In the East Sea 00

5. Gi Kim Ga;

○○○ ○

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Lee Jae-soo, Counsel Lee Jae-soo

○ Stock Company

Seoul Jongno-gu ○○

The representative director, the Nowon-gu, Doz., the Hunting of the Constitution, the Do governor

Law Firm Namsan, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Attorney Kim Tae-hun, Lee Jin-chul

July 17, 2009

August 21, 2009

1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff Kim ○-○ for 88, 956, 625 won, 62, 637, 750 won, 36, 318, 875 won, and 5% per annum from June 12, 2009 to August 21, 2009, and 20% per annum from the following day to the date of completion.

2. The plaintiffs' remaining claims are all dismissed.

3. 30% of the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiffs, the remainder of 70% by the defendant.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

Defendant 150, 000, 000, 000 won against Plaintiff Kim ○○, and 100, 000, 000 won against Plaintiff ○○○, and the Plaintiff

To ○○, ○○, ○○, and ○○, each gold of KRW 50,00,000, and each of them, a copy of the complaint in this case

5% per annum for the period from the day after service to the day of sentencing and 20% per annum for the period from such day to the day of full payment.

shall pay the amount of money at each ratio of this section.

1. Facts and judgment premised on the premise

A. The Defendant purchased the land to be incorporated into a golf course site in order to build ○○○○○○○○○○○, which is the Plaintiffs’ decedent, and purchased the land to be incorporated into the golf course site. The Defendant was punished by negotiations on the purchase of Nonparty Dol ○○ and the above ○○○○○ 518 Forest Land, 19,131 square meters (hereinafter “the instant land”).

B. However, if the purchase negotiation did not progress properly as a matter of price, the Defendant obtained the consent on the part of the deceased on the condition that the “agreement on the development project of a golf course” was reached. In that process, the Defendant promised to ensure free passage to the deceased on the land of this case, and to open cement packings from the existing roads of the ○○○○, rear and rear to the land of this case for its passage.

C. The road that the Defendant originally promised to open was in the form of blocking the road between the hole of 10 and the hole of 11. The Defendant modified the road to make the said golf course no more than 11 holes at a maximum of 6 domestic sexual harassment, and did not interfere with the deceased’s promise to build the road without implementing the plan with the deceased.

D. After that, the Defendant’s affiliate, and the OO (hereinafter “OO”) that is a company operating the above golf course (hereinafter “the above golf course,”) asserted that the agreement for road construction between the Deceased and the Defendant is not known, and the Defendant also stated on June 12, 2009 that the Defendant could not perform the said agreement with the Deceased, not the golf course operation company, on the seventh day of pleading, and thus, it is impossible to execute the said agreement in light of the empirical rule or transaction concept (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da14616, Jul. 26, 1996). Accordingly, the instant land was not adjacent to the public service and was de facto blind in the golf course (for the Plaintiffs to gain access to the grave of this case, the Plaintiffs should communicate to ○○ in advance, and then move to the golf course according to the control of the employees of the golf course, and then are in accordance with the control of the employees of the golf course).

E. On September 16, 2005, the Deceased died and received inheritance according to the inheritance ratio by the Plaintiffs.

[Ground of Recognition: Facts without dispute, Gap evidence, Gap evidence 1, Gap evidence 2-1, Gap evidence 2-3, Gap evidence 4, Gap evidence 1, 2, 3, Gap evidence 9, Gap evidence 11, and Gap evidence 17, the purport of the whole pleadings and arguments]

2. The assertion and judgment

A. According to the above facts, as the defendant is unable to implement the above road construction undertaking with the deceased, unless there are special circumstances, he is liable to compensate the plaintiffs who are their inheritors for the damages corresponding to the price decline of the land of this case for which the plaintiffs seek, among the damages suffered by the plaintiffs due to the above impossibility of performance.

(b) Scope of damages;

Furthermore, if the defendant's promise to open the road was observed so that the land of this case can pass free from the outside, the land of this case would have been preserved in its original form (referring to the land, such as forest and land preserved in its original form within the golf course), and since it was a blind forest as a result of impossibility of the execution of the promise, it would be the damage suffered by the plaintiffs equivalent to the difference in the market price. According to the appraiser Park Jong-○'s appraisal result, the difference between the market price and the date of the closing of the argument of this case is KRW 210,551,00 (248,83,000 won - 38,282,000 won).

If this is calculated according to the shares of the plaintiffs, the plaintiff Kim ○ shall be 78,956, 625 won (210, 551, 00 won x 3/8), the plaintiff Kim ○ shall be 52,637,750 won (210, 551, 00 won x 2/8), the plaintiff ○○, ○○, and ○○○ shall be 26, 318, 875 won (210, 551, 00 won x 1/8) respectively.

C. Part claiming consolation money

The plaintiffs asserts that the defendant suffered mental suffering due to the failure to freely pass the land of this case, in addition to the damages caused by the decline in the above land due to the defendant's impossibility of performance.

In general, even if a creditor suffers from mental suffering due to default, he/she shall be deemed to have suffered from property damage, and such suffering shall be deemed to have been caused. However, according to the motive, circumstance, and the degree of damage suffered by the creditor as a result of the default, there may be mental suffering that is not caused solely by compensation for property damage. If the debtor knew or could have known such special circumstance, he/she shall compensate the debtor for the damage caused by the mental suffering of the creditor.

In the instant case, as the Defendant did not perform the road opening commitments with the Deceased, the Plaintiffs are required to contact in advance on the side of ○○○ and move the road pursuant to the control of the employees of the golf club in order to access the grave on the instant land. As seen earlier, the Defendant raised an objection against the construction of the road before the Deceased’s death, which led to the Plaintiff’s death, and the lawsuit of this case was brought up to the lawsuit of this case, and it is impossible for the Plaintiffs to dispose of the instant land in fact because the land was made up to the original preservation of ○○○, and the land would not have any choice but to sell the instant land to ○○, which is the Defendant or its affiliate, and up to that time, the Plaintiffs would have been expected to continuously suffered from considerable inconvenience in entering the instant land. In light of the above, it is recognized that the Plaintiffs suffered from mental distress due to the Defendant’s nonperformance, and that the Defendant also knew or could have sufficiently known such circumstances.

Therefore, the defendant has the obligation to pay consolation money for such mental suffering to the plaintiffs, and as to that amount, the above plaintiffs had the obligation to pay consolation money for such mental suffering.

Considering the circumstances shown in the argument of this case, including the circumstance and the fact that the possibility of improvement of traffic convenience is not visible within a short period, the level of KRW 10,00,000 per each of the plaintiffs is reasonable.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the defendant is liable for damages and consolation money equivalent to the above land price 8,956,625 won (78,956,625 won + 10,000 won + 62,637,750 won (52,637,750 won + 10,000 won + 10,000 won) to the plaintiff ○○○, the plaintiff is liable for damages and consolation money equivalent to the above land price 88,956,625 won (78,956,625 won + 10,000 won). The defendant's claim for damages from the day after the above 26,318,875 won to the plaintiff ○○, and it is reasonable to dismiss the defendant's claim for damages from June 12, 2009 to the day when the plaintiff's obligation to open the road was finalized. Thus, the defendant's claim for damages from the day after the above 26,318,875 won per annum.

Judge Yellow-gu of the presiding judge

Judges Seo-won

Judges Doz.