The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal is that the victim B consistently states the content of the damage, such as the facts charged, not only in the investigative agency but also in the court below, and thus, it is against the rule of experience that the victim gave consent to his location tracking and recording in a situation where the victim has credibility in the victim’s statement and is

While the defendant operated a mobile phone sales store, he was able to utilize the mobile phone, while the victim was unable to utilize it, and the defendant abused this point and committed a crime.

Nevertheless, the jury made a wrong judgment that the victim's statement cannot be trusted, and the court of the original instance rendered a verdict not guilty by respecting the jury's judgment as it is. The judgment of the court below erred by misapprehending the facts.

2. The lower court determined that the instant facts charged constituted a case where there is no proof of a crime under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, on the grounds that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone is insufficient to deem that the instant facts charged was proven without reasonable doubt, following the trial proceedings conducted in the form of a participatory trial, the examination of the witness for B, and the examination of the accused, etc., conducted by the Defendant.

In light of the difference between the first instance court and the appellate court’s method of evaluating credibility of a witness’s statement in the first instance trial, considering the purport and spirit of the principle of substantial direct examination adopted by the Korean Criminal Procedure Act, the first instance court’s determination on the credibility of a witness’s statement in the first instance trial in light of the contents of the first instance judgment and the evidence duly examined by the first instance court, or the first instance court’s determination on the credibility of a witness’s statement in the first instance trial is clearly erroneous, taking into account the results of the first instance court’s examination