Text
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
Reasons
1. The Defendant issued the instant disposition on August 1, 2004, with the Plaintiff’s blood alcohol content of 0.07% on the ground that: (a) on July 15, 2005, the Plaintiff was driving each under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol content of 0.06% on July 15, 2005; and (b) on the ground that (c) on January 17, 2016, the Defendant was driving on the three-time basis, while under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol content of 0.063% on January 17, 2016, on the ground that (d) under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol content of 0.063% on March 5, 2016, the Defendant revoked the Plaintiff’s first-class large and first-class driver’s license (license number: C) on January 28, 2016 by applying Article 93(1)2 of the Road Traffic Act.
【Ground of recognition】 The fact that there is no dispute, Gap evidence 1, Eul evidence 1 through 5, the purport of the whole pleadings and arguments
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. The plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff's drinking alcohol level was measured about about 20 minutes after the final drinking time, and thus, it cannot be ruled out that the actual blood alcohol level at the time of driving was lower than 0.05%, which is the control standard for drinking driving. In light of the fact that the time when the plaintiff conducted driving before the lapse of 10 years, the time when the plaintiff conducted driving before the lapse of 10 years, cannot be deemed to be habitually and intentional, and the plaintiff's act cannot be deemed to be habitually and intentionally, and the plaintiff's depth of this act and the driver's license was cut off for his occupation, livelihood, etc., the disposition of this case is unlawful and unjust.
(b) The attached Form of relevant statutes is as follows.
C. As to the assertion regarding the increase in the 1st blood alcohol concentration, even if there exists an interval between the time when the blood alcohol concentration was driven and the time when the blood alcohol concentration was measured, such circumstance alone cannot be deemed as impossible to prove that the blood alcohol concentration at the time of actual driving exceeds the punishment standard, and in such a case, it was above the punishment standard level even at the time of driving.