The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The gist of the grounds for appeal (unfair sentencing) is that the lower court’s punishment (one hundred months of imprisonment, two years of suspended sentence, and forty hours of attending a compliance driving) is too uncomfortable and unfair.

2. In our criminal litigation law, which takes the principle of court-oriented trials and the principle of direct determination, there exists an area unique to the first instance court’s determination of sentencing. In addition, in light of the following in-depth nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the first instance judgment if there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the first instance judgment does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the first instance judgment falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the said sentence differs from the appellate court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The Defendant was punished four times in total on account of a crime of violating the Road Traffic Act (i.e., a penalty, (ii) a suspended sentence of imprisonment with labor, two times a suspended sentence), and (iii) a crime of causing an injury to the victim during the pertinent period of influence on March 3, 2003.

Nevertheless, in addition, drinking has been driven again and has caused traffic accidents.

The victims suffered from the instant traffic accident are three victims, and they did not agree with the victims.

Considering these circumstances, it is necessary to strictly punish the defendant.

However, at the time of the instant case, the Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration is relatively low to 0.074%; the instant traffic accident appears to be a relatively insignificant accident, and the degree of injury to the victims is not heavy; the victims are paid insurance money and the personal and physical damage caused by the instant accident appears to have been recovered to a certain extent; and the Defendant was not exposed to drinking for more than eight years prior to the instant case, since he was punished for driving under the influence of alcohol in around 209.