1. The plaintiffs' appeals against the defendants are dismissed.

2. This Court added Defendant G to this Court.

1. The reasoning for the judgment on this part of the judgment on the primary claim is as follows, except for the following additional determination as to the allegations added by the court of the first instance, and therefore, this part of the judgment is acceptable pursuant to the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

[Additional Decision] The plaintiffs asserts that the sales contract of this case was concluded by both agents of P, an intermediary assistant, and thus is invalid.

As examined below, Defendant G purchased the remaining shares in KRW 350,00,00 by proposing a purchase from P to which the authority to sell each of the instant real estate was delegated by the deceased and the Co-Defendant F of the first instance trial, taking over the obligation to refund the existing lease deposit and receiving a loan from each of the instant real estate as collateral. Even if the conclusion of the instant sales contract was made through P, it is merely a mere implementation on behalf of the Defendant G’s decision-making, and it cannot be deemed a legal act of representation. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ assertion cannot be accepted with different premise.

2. Determination on the conjunctive claim (as to Defendant G)

A. The plaintiffs asserted that if the sales contract of this case was effective, Defendant G is liable to pay KRW 175,000,000,000, which is equivalent to the portion of the deceased deceased A, the decedent of this case, according to the plaintiffs' inheritance shares.

B. P representing the cause of the claim by Defendant G on behalf of the deceased and the Codefendant F of the first instance trial, and part of the ownership of each of the instant real estate owned L, M, and H was subject to registration of ownership preservation in the future L, M, and H. However, L and M, which were the props of the J site in Seoul, Nowon-gu, Seoul, had already been or was scheduled to be settled at the time of the instant sales contract for their respective shares, and Defendant H had the obligation of loans, etc. in its name even if Defendant G’s children were not the parties to reconstruction.