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1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
Purport of claim and appeal
1..
Reasons
1. The reasoning of the court of first instance’s acceptance of the judgment is the same as the ground of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for adding the judgment as set forth in paragraph (2) below, and thus, citing it as it is by the main text of
2. The Plaintiff, within the development-restricted zone, owned the instant house on the C’s ground, and owned the right of reconstruction after the removal of the said house. However, the Plaintiff asserted that the Plaintiff lost the validity of the right of reconstruction, which was originally owned by the Plaintiff, by building a new building in the name of R on the instant land by evading the Defendant’s obligation to pay the price pursuant to the instant sales contract, and by building a new building in the name of R on the instant land.
However, as seen in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, the plaintiff cannot be granted the right of reconstruction because it fails to meet the requirements for the establishment of the right of reconstruction under the Development Restriction Zone Act, and since the defendant newly constructed a building under the name of R on the ground C at Guang-si, the plaintiff is not entitled to the right of reconstruction, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge the plaintiff's assertion. Thus,
[Plaintiff’s assertion that there is no reason to conclude the above sales contract without separation right, but it is not necessary to normatively determine whether there is a right of removal or not, and considering the overall purport of pleading in the testimony of the witness of the trial at the time of the present sales contract, the Plaintiff and the Defendant knew that the instant house was removed at the time of the present sales contract. However, the Plaintiff appears to have entered into the instant sales contract by mistake that the Plaintiff owned the so-called “right to apply for a permit of removal,” and only the Plaintiff did not fall under the requirements for new construction or removal under the Development Restriction Zone Act after filing an application for a building permit, etc. with the JJ (which is divided in king-si C) on January 29, 2015.