All appeals by the Defendants are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant A1) The lower court calculated the amount of the penalty on the grounds of Defendant A’s statement that he obtained KRW 300,000 per day, but the said amount of the penalty is also included in the amount of the penalty not derived from the arrangement of commercial sex acts. (2) The lower court’s sentence of unfair sentencing (the penalty of KRW 20,000,000,000,000,000) is too unreasonable.

B. The sentence of Defendant B (one year of imprisonment with prison labor for six months and one year of suspended execution) is too unreasonable.

2. The purpose of the additional collection under Article 25 of the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic is to eradicate the acts of arranging sexual traffic, etc., the scope of the additional collection is to be limited to the profits actually acquired by the offender. However, since the tax, etc. incurred by the offender in the course of performing the act of arranging sexual traffic is only one way to consume the money and valuables acquired in return for the act of arranging sexual traffic or to justify his/her act, the additional collection should not be deducted from the amount of the additional collection.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2009Do2223 Decided May 14, 2009, etc.). The Defendants’ offering of alcoholic beverages and liquors to customers sexual traffic is included in the act of arranging sexual traffic through the operation of entertainment taverns or merely an incidental act, and thus, cannot be deducted from the additionally collected amount on the grounds that the Defendants’ offering of alcoholic beverages and liquors to customers sexual traffic is merely an act of arranging sexual traffic through the operation of entertainment taverns

3. The Criminal Procedure Act, which adopts the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness on the Defendants’ assertion of unfair sentencing, has a unique area in the sentencing determination of the first instance court. As such, in a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion,