The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year and six months.

Sexual assault against the defendant for 80 hours.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (one year and six months of imprisonment, three years of suspended execution, two hundred hours of community service, and eight hours of sexual assault treatment lectures) is too uneasible and unreasonable.

B. It is improper that it does not disclose or notify the personal information of the criminal defendant involved in an improper exemption from disclosure disclosure order.

2. Determination

A. The fact that the defendant appears to have committed the crime of this case by contingency on the assertion of unfair sentencing is likely to have committed the crime of this case, that the crime of this case is committed with attempted attempted crimes, that the defendant is a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act around December 1989, and that there was no record of punishment for the same kind of crime of this case except for the previous crimes punished by fines on or around November 1999 due to the violation of the Road Traffic Act.

However, the crime of this case is an attempted attempt to have sexual intercourse with a victim in a state of impossibility to resist under the influence of alcohol, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the quality of the crime is light. The defendant did not take measures such as compensating the victim for damages caused by the crime of this case, taking into account the defendant's age, character and conduct, intelligence and environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime of this case, and other various circumstances that form the conditions for sentencing indicated in the record, such as the circumstances after the crime, etc., the sentence of the court below is too unreasonable.

The prosecutor's assertion of unfair sentencing is justified.

B. As to the wrongful assertion of exemption from disclosure disclosure order, the proviso of Article 37(1) and the proviso of Article 41(1) of the former Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes (wholly amended by Act No. 11556, Dec. 18, 2012) provide for exemption from disclosure disclosure order on the ground that “Provided, That the foregoing shall not apply where it is deemed that there are special circumstances in which disclosure of personal information should not be disclosed.”

On the other hand, each proviso of the above Articles requires disclosure and notification.