The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The sentencing of the lower court (the completion of a sexual assault treatment program for 5 years and 40 hours) on the summary of the grounds of appeal is too unreasonable.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on statutory penalty, and the discretionary determination is made within a reasonable and reasonable scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of sentencing of the first instance that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of direct jurisdiction taken by our criminal litigation law and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, the sentencing of sentencing of the first instance was exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively taking into account the factors and guidelines for sentencing specified in the first instance sentencing trial process.

In light of the records newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing hearing, it is reasonable to file an unfair judgment of the first instance court, only in cases where it is deemed unfair to maintain the sentencing of the first instance court as it is for the court to judge the sentencing of the first instance court.

In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, it is desirable to respect the sentencing of the first instance judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court rendered the above sentence to the Defendant with due regard to the sentencing as stated in its reasoning. The circumstances on the sentencing alleged by the Defendant in the first instance trial are most closely considered when determining the sentence in the lower court.

Unlike the judgment of the court below, the defendant recognized the crime of rape, confinement, etc. at the court below. However, the circumstance that the defendant agreed with the victim E or endeavored to recover from the damage does not seem to be a new circumstance to the extent that the evaluation of the defendant's responsibility for the act is different.

B. It is deemed that there has been special changes in circumstances more than those taken into account in the original judgment in sentencing conditions.

It is also difficult to see.