1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. Pursuant to the conjunctive claim added at the trial, the defendant 1,500.

1. Judgment as to the main claim

A. The Plaintiff, on April 28, 2015, lent KRW 3,000,000 to the Defendant on April 27, 2020 as due date, and the interest rate and overdue interest rate of KRW 34.9% per annum, the Plaintiff, as to whether to conclude a loan contract, requested the Defendant to pay the principal and interest on the loan to the Defendant.

On the other hand, Gap evidence No. 1 (a loan transaction contract, Gap evidence No. 4) consistent with the above argument cannot be used as evidence because there is no evidence to prove the authenticity, and each statement and image of evidence Nos. 3 and 5 are insufficient to recognize the above assertion, and there is no evidence to prove otherwise.

Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

B. The Plaintiff asserts to the effect that “A company, as the Defendant argued, obtained a loan from the Plaintiff by gathering the Defendant’s name and taking advantage of the Defendant’s name, the Defendant granted the right to representation regarding the loan by issuing his/her resident registration certificate to B and informing him/her of his/her deposit account number and password, and as the Plaintiff performed the loan after obtaining the Defendant’s certification through his/her mobile phone in the name of the Defendant, there were justifiable grounds to believe that B was the authority to conclude the instant loan contract on behalf of the Defendant, and therefore, the Defendant is liable for the instant loan contract under Article 126 of the Civil Act.”

Where an agent performs a legal act in his/her own name by deceiving himself/herself as if he/she was the principal, without expressing his/her act of representation by using his/her deceptive means, barring any special circumstance, an expression agent pursuant to Article 126 of the Civil Act shall not be established, unless there are any special circumstances. However, the representative has a fundamental right to represent the principal to the person who imitates himself/herself, and the other party has a justifiable reason to believe that he/she exercises his/her authority as the principal himself/herself.