1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal, including the part arising from the supplementary participation, are all assessed against the Plaintiff.

1. The reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance is as follows: ", 43, 36" in Part 20 of Part 13 of the Decision of the court of first instance; "A, 47" in Part 20 of the Decision of the court of first instance; "B, 47" in Part 17 of the Decision of the court of first instance; "A, 46" in Part 18 of the Evidence submitted by the plaintiff in Part 4 of the Decision of the court of first instance; "I, 43, and 44" in Part 20 of the Judgment of the court of first instance; and "I, B, and 47" in Part 18 of the Judgment of the court of first instance (including Evidence A submitted by the court of first instance) and "I, 46" in Part 3 of the Judgment of the court of final appeal (Supreme Court Decision 2017Do630

In addition to adding the supplementary judgment as to the Plaintiff’s assertion of “the illegality of the procedures for the secondary strike” as set forth in paragraph (2) above, it is consistent with the reasoning of the first instance judgment. As such, Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act

(1) The court of first instance that rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion on the grounds of illegality in the procedure of the second strike on February 2, 2007, even if both the evidence submitted by the court of first instance and the additional evidence submitted in the trial are examined, the judgment of the court of first instance that rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion on the grounds of illegality in the procedure of the second strike.

A. In relation to the holding of a separate vote for and against a union member's vote on wage negotiations in 2013 before the first strike, the Plaintiff asserts that the second strike was unlawful due to the following: (a) the substance of the vote was related to the “domination against the establishment of the KTX corporation,” and thus, (b) it cannot be deemed that there was an pros and cons vote on wage negotiations; (c) even if there was a pro and cons vote on wage negotiations, even if there was no pro and cons vote on the pending issues in the instant case, the second strike was unlawful

However, from November 20, 2013 to November 22, 2013, a union member vote on wage negotiations in 2013 (hereinafter “instant pro-con voting”), and the wage negotiations in 2013 and the pending issues of this case were discussed.