1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the defendant exceeding the following amount ordered to be paid shall be revoked.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. On November 1, 1996, the Plaintiff lent KRW 20,000,00 to the Defendant at an annual interest rate of 24%.

B. On September 16, 2013, the Defendant prepared a loan certificate (Evidence A2) to the Plaintiff to repay KRW 20,000,000 to the Plaintiff monthly (as stated).

[Ground of recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1 and 2

2. Determination

A. The Defendant is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff interest or delay damages calculated by the rate of 24% per annum from November 1, 1996 to the date of full payment, which is the loan 20,000,000,000 and the amount of the loan 20,000,000 won, barring special circumstances.

B. (1) The Defendant asserted that the debt of the instant loan was extinguished due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the Plaintiff’s intent to approve the Plaintiff’s debt after the expiration of the statute of limitations is proved to have waived the statute of limitations.

On the other hand, the loan in this case is a claim whose maturity date is not determined and whose starting point of the statute of limitations has occurred and it is apparent in the record that the lawsuit in this case was filed after the lapse of 10 years thereafter (3 years in the case of interest bonds). Thus, the statute of limitations for principal bonds and interest bonds has expired.

However, on September 16, 2013, after the completion date of the statute of limitations, the Defendant made it clear that he/she had given the intent to repay the leased principal by giving a certificate of borrowing KRW 20,00,000 to the leased principal. In regard to the leased principal claim, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant renounced the statute of limitations benefits after the expiration of the statute

Therefore, the Defendant’s assertion of extinctive prescription is justified only for the part of the interest claim (the contents of the above loan certificate are merely the intent to pay the leased principal, and it cannot be deemed that the Defendant renounced the extinctive prescription benefit even with respect to the interest claim with the expiration of prescription, on the grounds that no mention is made about the interest) and ten years again with respect to the part of the principal claim.