1. All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

1. On April 30, 2003, the Defendant lent KRW 37,000,000 to the Plaintiff as interest rate of KRW 5% per month and on April 30, 2006. On the same day, the Plaintiff B guaranteed the Defendant’s above loan obligation against the Defendant.

(hereinafter referred to as “instant loan”). [Ground of recognition] A without dispute, entry of evidence No. 1, and purport of the entire pleadings

2. The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant for the instant loan against the Plaintiffs was extinguished by ten years from April 30, 2006, the due date for payment of the loan, which was ten years after the expiration of the extinctive prescription period. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim seeking confirmation of the absence of the above obligation against the

In addition, since the plaintiff A was determined by the Chuncheon District Court No. 2009Da1971, and the plaintiff B became final and conclusive by the 2009Da1969, the above obligation against the defendant is a claim that cannot be claimed as a blanket exemption.

3. Determination

A. On April 30, 2003, the defendant lent KRW 37,00,00 to the plaintiff A on April 30, 2003 with interest rate of KRW 5%, and the due date of repayment on April 30, 2006. On the same day, the plaintiff B guaranteed the defendant's above loan obligation against the plaintiff Eul, as seen above. The extinctive prescription period of the loan claim of this case is to run from May 1, 2006, and according to the evidence Eul evidence No. 3, the defendant applied for a payment order against the plaintiffs on April 28, 2016 before the expiration of 10 years from the above date, and confirmed on June 16, 2016. Thus, the statute of limitations of the loan claim of this case is interrupted.

Unlike this, the plaintiffs' assertion that the application for payment order does not have the effect of interrupting extinctive prescription is without merit.

B. The determination of exemption pursuant to the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act does not substantially extinguish the obligation, but only the responsibility ceases to exist. The obligation itself is the obligation.