1. The Defendant deposited at the Seoul Central District Court No. 27825, Dec. 15, 2015, KRW 550,700,700.

1. Basic facts

A. On October 12, 1939, with respect to each real estate listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter “instant real estate”), the ownership transfer registration was completed in the name of H with each address located in Jung-gu Seoul Special Metropolitan City E (1, 2 real estate), Seoul Jung-gu F (3, 4 real estate), and Seoul Jung-gu G (5 real estate) around October 12, 1939.

B. In order to acquire the instant real estate as the implementer of D Housing Redevelopment Improvement Project, the Defendant filed an application for adjudication on expropriation with the Central Land Expropriation Committee to grant KRW 50,700,000 for the said adjudication on expropriation. On December 15, 2015, the Defendant deposited KRW 550,700,000 on the ground that the name, “H”, “Seoul Central District Court E, Jung-gu, Seoul Central District Court E, and “the receipt due to unknown address” as “the receipt due to unknown address” under the Seoul Central District Court Decision 27825, Dec. 15, 2015.

(hereinafter “Deposit of this case”). C.

I, to the south of J, the J died on April 17, 1942 and succeeded to Australia. D.

I died on August 1, 1994, and succeeded to the property of Plaintiff B and C, the wife of Plaintiff A, Plaintiff B and C.

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence 1 through 9, 11, Eul evidence 1 (including satisfy numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The assertion and judgment

A. The alleged plaintiffs sought confirmation that the right to claim for withdrawal of the instant deposit is against the plaintiffs under the premise that H’s registered titleholder H in the instant real estate is the same as J, the plaintiffs, and the defendant asserted that the registered titleholder H in the instant real estate of this case cannot be deemed the same as the plaintiffs’ fleet and the same person. Even if so, I cannot be deemed to have succeeded to the property of J even if the same person was the same, and therefore, I cannot be deemed to have succeeded to the instant real estate.

B. In full view of the facts of recognition as to whether the registered titleholder H and the plaintiffs J are the same, Gap evidence Nos. 8 and 10 and the fact-finding inquiry to the head of Yongsan-gu Office of this Court and the purport of the entire arguments.