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1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
Reasons
1. On June 10, 2017, the Defendant issued a disposition to revoke the Plaintiff’s driver’s license (Class I large, Class I ordinary, Class I special (Rescue), Class I common, Class II common, and Class II common, and Class II motor vehicles) as of July 23, 2017, on the ground that the Plaintiff driven a D body-man’s driver’s license (hereinafter “instant disposition”) while under the influence of alcohol level of 0.13% at the front of the former C hotel located in Changwon-si, Changwon-si, Masan (hereinafter “instant disposition”).
On July 14, 2017, the Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal with the Central Administrative Appeals Commission on the instant disposition, and the Central Administrative Appeals Commission rendered a ruling dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim on August 31, 2017.
[Reasons for Recognition] Entry No. 1 of Eul and the purport of the whole pleading
2. Whether the disposition is lawful;
A. In order for the Plaintiff to continue to serve as a truck driver and maintain his family’s livelihood, the instant disposition is unlawful since it deviatess from and abused discretion, in light of the fact that the driver’s license is essential.
B. In light of the following: (a) traffic accidents caused by drinking driving are frequent and the result thereof is harsh; (b) the public interest needs to prevent traffic accidents caused by drinking driving; and (c) the revocation of a driver’s license on the ground of drinking driving should be more severe than the disadvantage of the party due to the revocation, unlike ordinary beneficial administrative acts, unlike the case of ordinary beneficial administrative acts; (d) the Plaintiff’s drinking level constitutes the criteria for revocation of a driver’s license under Article 91(1) [Attachment Table 28] of the Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act; and (e) there are no special circumstances to deem the instant disposition to be remarkably unreasonable; and (e) the Plaintiff’s history of drinking driving (0.88% of blood alcohol level on May 19, 2013).