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(영문) 전주지방법원 2019.08.16 2018가단26842
구상금
Text

The Plaintiff, within the scope of the property inherited from the deceased H, Defendant C’s KRW 27,255,440 as well as the Plaintiff’s KRW 27,255,440.

Reasons

Around 18:00 on November 7, 2017, the network H (hereinafter referred to as “the network”) driven an I Cargo under Defendant B’s name (hereinafter “instant Cargo”) while under the influence of alcohol 0.207% of the blood alcohol concentration without a driver’s license on November 18, 2017, and was driving in the front of the J in Gunsan-si into the military mountain, Cheongsan-do, and Cheongdok-do, while driving in the front of the same direction, the K Driving’s Twitter going forward in the same direction, and caused K to suffer injury, such as two parts of the detailed identification and the extension of the inner frame.

(A) Nos. 1 and 2, and the foregoing accident (hereinafter “instant accident”). The Plaintiff was entrusted by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport with the duties of compensation under Article 30(1) of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (hereinafter “Act”) pursuant to Article 45(1) of the same Act, and paid 81,766,320 won of the insurance proceeds to K until August 3, 2018 as compensation for damages arising from the instant accident.

(No. 5). Defendant C, D, E, and G reported qualified acceptance as the inheritor of the deceased.

The Plaintiff asserted that Defendant B is liable for damages as the owner of the instant vehicle pursuant to Article 3 of the Automobile Loss Act.

However, in full view of the purport of the entire pleadings in the statements Nos. 2, 3, and 4-1, 4-2, Defendant B is recognized as having never known the location of the instant cargo vehicle since it transferred the instant cargo to the creditor around 1999, including necessary documents for the transfer of the ownership.

Thus, it is reasonable to deem that Defendant B was off from the position of exercising the operation control of the above cargo vehicle at the time of the accident of this case or obtaining operational benefits.

(See Supreme Court Decision 91Da41866 delivered on April 14, 1992). Therefore, Defendant B cannot be deemed to be “a person who operates an automobile for his own sake” as prescribed by Article 3 of the Automobile Loss Act, and thus, the Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant B cannot be accepted.

Defendant C, D, E, and G above-mentioned facts.

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