1. The plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

1. Basic facts

A. The Plaintiffs own 1/2 shares of F forest land in the Dong-gu, Dong-gu, Chungcheongnam-gu (hereinafter “the instant forest”) in proportion to 1/2 shares.

The forest of this case is a land that cannot be contributed to having contributed without passing through another person's land.

B. The Defendant is the owner of 262560 square meters of Dodong-dong, Chungcheongnam-gu, Seoul Special Metropolitan City (hereinafter “D Forest”) and 54725 square meters of Do (hereinafter “E site”).

【Fact that there has been no dispute, Gap 1's evidence (including virtual number), and the purport of the whole pleading】

2. The assertion and judgment

A. The instant forest land owned by the Plaintiffs is a master land and cannot be used as a contribution without having access to D forest and E site owned by the Defendant, and thus, among D forest land, there is a right to passage over surrounding land on each point of (a) section 1, 2, 3, 4, and 1 of the attached Table 1 in the line connecting each point of (a) section 100 square meters and attached Table 1 in the line connecting each point of (b) section 3,4,5,6, and 3 of the attached Table 1 among the land and E, and the part (a) and (b) above are 120 square meters in the line connecting each point of (a) and (b

B. Determination 1) Since the right to passage over surrounding land under Article 219 of the Civil Act limits the use of surrounding land for the purpose of using the land without a passage necessary for its use between the public service and the public service, the scope of the right to passage should be recognized within the scope of the place and method where the damage to the surrounding land owner is the lowest. The scope of the right to passage should be determined in light of social norms after considering the topography, locational shape and use relation of the surrounding land, surrounding geographic situation, understanding of the neighboring land users, and other various circumstances, and then the scope of the right to passage should be determined in consideration of specific cases. Furthermore, it should not be determined as a passage way to prepare for the future use situation in advance (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da50656, Feb. 3, 1995).