The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff).

The grounds of appeal are examined,

1. As to the ground of appeal No. 1, the lower court, based on its stated reasoning, related to the claim for the unpaid rent from the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter “Defendant”) against the counterclaim, based on the following circumstances: (a) the part on the claim for the rent from the Plaintiff’s (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter “Defendant”) based on the instant GSA contract against the instant GSA contract against the PP

The part of the claim for the rent due to the vehicle-to-face operation under the instant GSA agreement was dismissed on the ground that it cannot claim the fee under the said contract for the shuttle operation during the lawful operation suspension period. On the contrary, the part of the claim for the rent due to the vehicle-to-face operation under the instant additional contract was partly accepted only for the vehicle-to-face operation fee included in the said contract.

Examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, the above determination by the lower court is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine

2. As to the ground of appeal No. 2, the lower court partially accepted the part of the cost of internal food service only on the ground that, among the Defendant’s counterclaims, the cost of internal food service provided to passengers should be borne by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter “Plaintiff”) pursuant to the Annex to the instant GSA agreement, but the so-called “Handing charge”, which is an additional cost for internal food transport, cannot be deemed to be borne by the Plaintiff.

Examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, the above determination by the lower court is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine

3. As to the ground of appeal No. 3, the lower court did not deem that the Plaintiff’s notice of termination as of March 6, 2015 regarding the instant GIST contract constituted nonperformance of obligation, and Article 3 of the instant GIST contract.