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(영문) 대전지방법원 2019.11.21 2019노2228
특수상해등
Text

The judgment below

Of them, the part against Defendant A shall be reversed.

Defendant

A shall be punished by imprisonment for seven months.

Seized evidence 1.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The Prosecutor (Defendant A: imprisonment with prison labor for a maximum term of one year, ten months and confiscation, Defendant B: imprisonment with prison labor for a term of one year, one year of suspended execution, two years of suspended execution, probation, etc.) of the lower court is deemed unreasonable.

B. The Defendant A’s sentence is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. Defendant A’s ex officio determination with respect to Defendant A constitutes a juvenile provided for in Article 2 of the Juvenile Act at the time the judgment of the court below was handed down, and thus, the sentence is mitigated pursuant to Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act, and the sentence of a non-scheduled sentence pursuant to Article 60(1) of the Juvenile Act was rendered pursuant to the same Act. However, it is apparent that Defendant A was adult at the time of the trial. As such, the judgment of the court below that sentenced Defendant A to mitigation of juvenile offenses and non-scheduled sentence became impossible to

B. The Prosecutor’s judgment on the prosecutor’s assertion of unfair sentencing on Defendant B is a discretionary judgment based on the statutory penalty that takes into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act within a reasonable and appropriate scope.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of the first instance court that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of directness taken by our Criminal Procedure Act and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, it is reasonable to reverse the unfair judgment of the first instance court only in cases where it is deemed that the judgment of the first instance court exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively considering the conditions of sentencing in the course of the first instance sentencing review and the sentencing criteria, etc., or where it is deemed unfair to maintain the first instance sentencing as it is in full view of the materials newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing review.

In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, it is desirable to respect the sentencing of the first instance court in the absence of such exceptional circumstances.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015, etc.).

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