The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the first ground for appeal, in order to establish the “crime of defamation by a false statement of fact” under Article 70(2) of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc., the criminal must publicly indicate the fact, and should have known that the alleged fact would undermine the people’s social evaluation, and should have recognized that such fact was false. In the event that the important part of the grounds for appeal is consistent with objective facts, there is a little difference from the truth or somewhat exaggerated expression in detail.

Although it cannot be viewed as a false fact, in determining whether it is a false fact, it should be determined whether it is an important part that is not consistent with objective facts by examining the purport of the whole contents of the alleged fact.

In addition, “the purpose of slandering a person” under Article 70(2) of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. requires the intention or purpose of a harming a person, and whether a person is intended to defame a person ought to be determined by considering the overall circumstances concerning the expression itself, such as the content and nature of the relevant publicly alleged fact, the scope of the counter-party to whom the relevant fact was published, and the method of expression, etc., and by comparing and considering the degree of infringement

(1) In light of the facts and circumstances stated in the judgment below, the lower court found the Defendant guilty of the instant charges on the ground that the content of the instant printed matter was not consistent with objective facts, and the Defendant recognized that the content was false, and that there was a purpose of slandering the victims. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence.