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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2018.05.11 2017나83982
부당이득금
Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

Reasons

1. The reasons for this court to accept the judgment of the court of first instance are as follows: (a) the Defendant’s “Defendant” under Section 12 of the judgment of the court of first instance, as “the Plaintiff’s “fact-finding”; (b) the 5th page No. 14 as “fact-finding”; (c) the Plaintiff’s “Plaintiff’s vehicle” under Sections 3 and 4 as “the Defendant’s vehicle”; and (d) the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff emphasized or added in the trial are identical to the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance, except for adding “the additional judgment” as to the assertion that the Plaintiff emphasizes or added in the trial, thereby

2. Additional determination

A. The Plaintiff’s alleged driver A was indicted for violating the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents, but the judgment of not guilty was affirmed, and as such, A was negligent in exceeding the limited speed.

There is no proximate causal relation with the accident of this case.

B. (1) The judgment (1) held that a criminal liability for a tort is held liable for an act in violation of the legal order of society, and the content of a public sanction (criminal punishment) against an offender is as follows: (a) civil liability is held individually responsible for an act in violation of another person’s legal interest; (b) thus, the compensation for damages incurred to the victim is based on the guiding principle. Therefore, even if it does not constitute a criminal offense, whether it constitutes a tort under the civil law should be examined from a perspective separate from criminal liability.

(See Supreme Court Decisions 71Da1985 delivered on November 15, 1971, 99Da35799 delivered on October 22, 199, etc.). (2) In full view of the respective descriptions and the entire purport of the evidence Nos. 1 and 2, the Plaintiff’s driver was indicted for violating the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents, but the Plaintiff’s driver was able to find out the entry of Defendant’s driver into the intersection and avoid collision if he had followed the restricted speed.

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