1. The defendant's notary public against the plaintiffs is E Law Firm No. 1117, July 2, 2008.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. The defendant is a person who operated a job placement office called "G" in the F, etc. of Changwon-si, and the plaintiff A is a contact worker who was employed by the defendant in the job placement office operated by the defendant.

B. On July 2, 2008, the Plaintiffs and the Defendant lent KRW 40,00,000 to Plaintiff A at interest rate of 30% per annum under the joint and several guarantee of Plaintiff B and C, and the Plaintiff A agreed to repay this by July 16, 2008. However, in the event that the Plaintiffs delay the repayment of the principal and interest of the loan, a notarial deed of a monetary loan for consumption (hereinafter “notarial deed of this case”) was drawn up to the effect that there is no objection even if the Plaintiffs are subject to compulsory execution.

C. The Plaintiff A remitted to the Defendant the amount of KRW 800,000 on December 17, 2008, KRW 500,000 on December 20, 2008, and KRW 1,500,000 on January 8, 2009, respectively, for the repayment of the obligation based on the instant notarial deed.

[Ground of recognition] The absence of dispute, entry of Gap 1 through 3, and 15 evidence, and the result of an order issued to submit financial transaction information to the H Federation Chairperson of this Court, the whole purport of the pleading

2. The judgment merchant's act is presumed to be for business, and the act performed by the merchant for business is deemed to be a commercial activity (Article 47 of the Commercial Act). If a claim arising from a commercial activity is not exercised for five years, the extinctive prescription expires (Article 64 of the Commercial Act). According to the above facts of recognition, the defendant is a merchant engaged in a commercial activity under Article 46 subparagraph 11 of the Commercial Act. The defendant's act of lending money to the plaintiff A is deemed to be a commercial activity under Article 46 (11) of the Commercial Act,

However, as seen earlier, the fact that Plaintiff A remitted money to the Defendant by January 8, 2009 for the repayment of the obligation based on the instant notarial deed is obvious in the record that five years have passed thereafter. Thus, insofar as there is no evidence to acknowledge that the Defendant was taking measures of interrupting prescription under Article 168 of the Civil Act prior to the expiration date of the extinctive prescription ( January 8, 2014), this case against the Plaintiffs.