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1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;
2. All plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.
3. The plaintiffs' total costs of litigation.
Reasons
1. The reasons why this Court shall state this part of the basic facts are as follows: (a) it is identical to the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance, except where the "O" of the second instance under the fifth of the judgment of the court of first instance is referred to as "O of the witness of the court of first instance"; and (b) therefore, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of
2. Determination
A. Even if the Defendant’s liability for damages is recognized to have priority to determine extinctive prescription defense, if the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages of this case expired due to the expiration of prescription, the Plaintiffs’ claim in this case is groundless, and thus, it should be first determined whether the statute of limitations expired.
B. The right to claim damages against the State on the ground of tort against the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription expires unless it is exercised for five years from the date of the tort (amended by Law No. 42 of Apr. 7, 1921; Article 32 of the former Accounting Act before repealed by Law No. 217 of Sept. 24, 1951). This is different from the short-term extinctive prescription period of Article 766(1) of the Civil Act, and it is immediately proceeding from the date of tort, and even if there was a confirmation that the victim was a victim of the sacrifice before and after the Korean War under the previous Reorganization Act, the extinctive prescription of the right to claim damages has already expired at the time five years from the date of the occurrence of damage to the sacrifers.
(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819 Decided May 16, 2013). As seen earlier, the deceased was killed in a civilian sacrifice case at the time of March 1949. Examining these facts in light of the aforementioned legal principles, the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages is deemed to have already expired at the lapse of five years from the date on which the deceased died.
C. Whether the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription constitutes abuse of rights