1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The first instance court.

1. The reasoning for the court's explanation of this case is that "the defendant" in Part 5 of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be dismissed to "the plaintiff," and " even if not," in Part 6, 8, and 9 of the judgment of the court of first instance shall also be deleted to "the plaintiff," and the reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance shall be stated in the part of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for adding the following judgments as to the matters alleged by the plaintiff in the court of first instance. Thus, it shall be cited as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article

2. Additional matters to be determined;

A. Since the father B of the Plaintiff’s assertion as to the legal representative of the Plaintiff did not sign or consent to the special agreement on the institution of an action, the special agreement on the institution of an action between the Plaintiff and the Defendant (hereinafter “special agreement on the institution of an action”) is null and void.

The Plaintiff’s mother C prepared and sent the Plaintiff’s mother C, on the ground that the instant secondary agreement was merely an act requiring the Defendant’s employee E, which is an employee of the Defendant, and thus, is null and void as the Defendant knew of such circumstances.

B. Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of arguments as to evidence Nos. 13-1 and evidence No. 15, Eul made a telephone conversation with E on October 15, 2013, and in light of the fact that the date when Eul signed with respect to the special agreement on the instant secondary complaint is October 15, 2013, the date when Eul signed with respect to the special agreement on the instant secondary complaint is immediately after the said telephone conversation, it is reasonable to view that Eul sent the same fact to Eul and had Eul sign the special agreement on the instant secondary complaint, and that Eul did not consent to the special agreement on the instant secondary complaint, the above assertion by the plaintiff is without merit.

In addition, immediately before the preparation of the written request for payment, B calls for “whether the Plaintiff’s disease is seen as congenital or rare incurable disease,” and “E” means that the Plaintiff’s disease is congenital disease, and the Plaintiff’s disease is irrelevant to the congenitality.