1. As to each real estate listed in the list of real estate attached to the Plaintiff, the Defendant shall have jurisdiction over the Incheon District Court Branch on March 1994.

1. Determination as to the cause of the claim: ① around March 1994, the Defendant lent KRW 80 million to the Plaintiff without setting the due date; ② The Plaintiff set up each of the instant collateral security rights (hereinafter “each of the instant collateral security rights”) by completing the registration of the establishment of each of the instant collateral security rights with respect to each of the instant real estate with respect to the instant loan as the secured obligation; ③ the Defendant notified the Plaintiff on February 16, 2004 that the instant loan should be repaid by February 28, 2004; or there is no dispute between the parties, or it can be recognized by adding up the entire arguments as indicated in the evidence Nos. 1, 3 (including the serial number), 1, 2, and 2.

According to the above facts, the claim of this case, which is the claim secured by each of the right to collateral of this case, is a claim with no fixed period during which the claim is established, and the extinctive prescription is in progress from the time when the claim is established (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da27184, Jan. 28, 2005). However, the initial date of the extinctive prescription is the starting point of calculating the period of extinctive prescription that falls under the requirement of legal effect that is the extinguishment of the obligation, and is specific fact that constitutes the legal requirement of the defense of extinctive prescription, and thus, it is subject to the principle of pleading. Therefore, if the initial date of the extinctive

(See Supreme Court Decision 94Da35886 Decided August 25, 1995, etc.). However, the ten years have passed since February 28, 2004, which was the due date for the instant loan claims asserted by the Plaintiff, and the period of prescription under Article 162(1) of the Civil Act has already expired on February 28, 2014, barring any special circumstance, since the instant loan claims, which are the secured claims of each of the instant mortgage claims, have already expired on February 28, 2014, the Defendant, barring any special circumstance, is limited to the Plaintiff’s ground for