Whether a creditor who has been solicited to file a report on bonds from an obligor who has completed the report on bonds at the time of the promulgation of an emergency order on economic stability and growth is deemed to have already ceased to exist, or not, even if it is not so, if he/she fails to report bonds, he/she is deemed not to fall under corporate bonds to be reported by an emergency order.

Under the circumstances where it was not easy to interpret the definition of corporate bonds at the time of the promulgation of an emergency order related to economic stability and growth, if a female female under 60 years of age who can understand the definition of corporate bonds at the time of the promulgation of an emergency order is confirmed by the debtor, taking into account the contents reported on the ground and by the public official under the jurisdiction and the attorney-at-law who delegated the lawsuit, although he/she was recommended to report the bonds by the debtor, and even if not, it is believed that the bonds are already extinguished, it shall not be punishable if he/she fails to report it.

Defendant

Prosecutor

Attorney Lee Young-young

Daegu High Court Decision 73No516 delivered on September 5, 1974

The appeal is dismissed.

The original judgment shall be based on the evidence that it accepted.

The Defendant is an emergency order with respect to the stabilization and growth of economy (hereinafter referred to as “emergency order”) on this claim.

It is unreasonable for the defendant to report the bond from the debtor who completed the report of the bond, but the interpretation of the definition of the bond under the urgent order was not easy at the time, and the defendant cannot determine whether the bond is an urgent corporate bond under the age of 60, so it is difficult to judge whether the bond is an urgent corporate bond at the time of the report, and the business inspection conducted by the debtor is not the time of the establishment of the bond, and it is confirmed that the bond is not an enterprise bond under the jurisdiction of the defendant, and that it is not an urgent corporate bond under the jurisdiction of the defendant, and it is confirmed again that the bond is not an urgent corporate bond under the jurisdiction of the defendant, even if it is proved that the bond was extinguished by legal compromise, and it is not clear that the defendant's credit is not an urgent corporate bond under the jurisdiction of the defendant, and that it is not an urgent corporate bond under the jurisdiction of the law, and it is not easy for the defendant to report the bond under the jurisdiction of the defendant to the extent that it is not an urgent bond under the jurisdiction of the defendant.

A corporate bond to be reported by an emergency order even if it has been extinguished or not by a compromise.

Recognizing that it does not fall under the above should be reasonable, and therefore, it shall not be punishable on the ground that the defendant did not report it. The purport of the original judgment is the same as above, and the prosecutor's grounds of appeal are examined. First, even if this case constitutes corporate bonds, as stated in the original judgment, the defendant did not report it to the court that it does not constitute corporate bonds even if it was extinguished or if it is not so, it would not constitute corporate bonds. The purport of the original judgment is that the defendant would not be justified in failing to report it. Second, the original judgment does not err by misapprehending the legal principles of emergency order, and the purport of the original judgment is that the defendant believed that this case was extinguished by legal compromise, and the defendant believed that this case was not only because this case was already extinguished by this loan for consumption, nor was the defendant believe that this case was not a debtor, but also the defendant believed that this case was not a legitimate one in the process of acquiring the original judgment, and the defendant cannot be seen to have been in violation of the provisions of Article 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act since it was clear and clear that this case was not in the original judgment.

Justices Hong Man-hee (Presiding Justice)