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(영문) 서울남부지방법원 2015.10.22 2015나3759
대여금
Text

1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. According to the statement in Gap evidence No. 1, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for a loan claim with the Southern Branch of Seoul District Court 2003da15383, Jun. 5, 2003, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff the amount of KRW 55 million and the interest calculated at the rate of 5% per annum from April 23, 1999 to June 5, 2003, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment, and the above judgment becomes final and conclusive on July 1, 2003, barring any special circumstance, the defendant is obligated to pay the above money to the plaintiff.

2. As to this, the Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff’s above claim had expired after the completion of prescription, the period of extinctive prescription pursuant to the final judgment is 10 years from the time when the judgment became final and conclusive, and the fact that the instant lawsuit was filed on May 2, 2014, which was ten years after the said judgment became final and conclusive on July 1, 2003, is apparent in the record, and thus, the Plaintiff’s above claim became extinct due to the completion of extinctive prescription.

[The plaintiff, after the closing of argument in the trial at the trial, submitted a document to the effect that the above judgment was enforced against the defendant's corporeal movables as an executive title, and that the defendant approved the defendant's obligation to the plaintiff on July 2005, the extinctive prescription of the claim was suspended. Although there is no need to determine the argument in the briefs submitted and not stated after the closing of argument, even in light of the above argument, the prescription is suspended when the execution procedure for corporeal movables was commenced without suspending the extinctive prescription, and where the execution procedure was impossible because there was no movable property to be seized even after the commencement of the execution procedure, the prescription is newly progress from the completion of the execution procedure (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da10044, May 13, 201).

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