A. Even in so-called so-called co-principals, if they leave the relationship of conspiracy before the others reach the action, they shall not be held liable for such co-principals.

B. In such a case, the expression of intent to waive does not necessarily require an explicit expression.

A. Even in so-called so-called co-principals, when they leave the relationship of conspiracy before they reach the commission of the so-called co-principals, they do not assume the responsibility of co-principals

(b) Liability when he deserts from his position before the others reach the commission of the conduct;

C. In such a case, the expression of intention of renunciation does not necessarily require an explicit expression.

Article 30 of the Criminal Act

Defendant

Prosecutor

Seoul High Court Decision 71No232 delivered on October 22, 1971

The appeal is dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal by the Prosecutor of the Gwangju High Prosecutor's Office on behalf of the Prosecutor Kim Jin;

In so-called so-called "joint principal offender", the principal case is that unless there are other special circumstances, the co-principal cannot be exempted from the liability for the crime of co-principal with respect to the act of sharing the shares of other co-principal, even though he did not directly participate in the act of the conduct thereafter, unless there are other special circumstances (Supreme Court Order 1948.1.2, 4281 Form 4). However, if a certain person among co-principals deserts from his competitive relationship before the other co-principals reach the action, he shall not be held liable for the other co-principal's act thereafter.

In this case, according to the facts duly established by the court below, Defendant 2 was her victim 2 and did not take a shelter near the victim 1 at the time of the commission of the crime against the victim 1, and the evidence at the time of the court of first instance cited by the court below was reviewed by the records, Defendant 2 was under the charge of the crime (violation of the Punishment of Violence, etc. Act) and the victim 2 was her wrong act and prevented others from taking the victim 1's wrong act as stated in its judgment, and was forced to take an emergency medical treatment at a pharmacy with approximately 40 meters away from his own act (the defendant returned home), and the facts of the crime (special violence) (2) crime were committed by only other accomplices after the above her pharmacy. Thus, the court below's judgment was justified under the premise that the defendant took part in the crime of violence and etc. under the premise that he did not have an explicit opinion as to the crime of violation of the Punishment of Violence, etc. Act (the crime of violence and etc.).

Therefore, it is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating judges.

The judges of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge)