All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. In the event that an obligor, as to the grounds of appeal by a public prosecutor, agrees to set up a mortgage or set up a mortgage on movable property owned by him/her in accordance with the Act on Mortgage on Motor Vehicles and other Specific Movables in order to secure a pecuniary obligation, the obligor’s obligation to provide a movable property as a collateral, i.e., the obligor’s obligation to maintain and preserve the collateral value, to passive obligation not to damage, reduce, or destroy the collateral, to which the obligee or his/her designated person would actually deliver the collateral to the obligee at the time of executing the security right, and to cooperate in the obligee’s exercise of the security

Therefore, the obligor’s performance of the above obligation is merely an obligor’s own business, and the obligor cannot be deemed to have entrusted the obligee’s business based on a fiduciary relationship with the obligee beyond an ordinary contractual relationship. Therefore, the obligor cannot be deemed to fall under “a person who administers another’s business,” who is the subject of breach of trust, in relation to the obligee.

Therefore, even if a debtor reduces or loses the value of a security by disposing of a security to a third party, thereby causing danger to the creditor's exercise of security right or the realization of a claim through this, a breach of trust

The above legal doctrine likewise applies to the case where the obligor arbitrarily disposes of the movable property mortgaged under the Factory and Mining Foundation Mortgage Act in order to secure a pecuniary obligation (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2020Do6258, Oct. 22, 2020). Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court acquitted the Defendant on the grounds that there was no proof of a crime regarding the part of breach of trust among the facts charged in the instant case.

The judgment below

The relevant legal principles and records.