The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. In the crime of mistake of facts and misapprehension of the legal doctrine by compulsion, the injury includes an indecent act itself or an indecent act resulting from an indecent act by force.

The following circumstances acknowledged by the prosecutor’s evidence are as follows: ① the Defendant was already aware of the fact that young women working as E department store staff at the rooftop room of this case; ② the Defendant was found in the rooftop room of this case; ② the time between the Defendant was three new walls; ③ the Defendant her scambling the victim immediately her opening the door and pushed the victim into the house; ④ the Defendant scambling the victim’s face, ④ the Defendant scaming the victim’s face into the house; ④ the Defendant scaming the victim’s face against the victim into the house; ⑤ the Defendant scam and scam only once into the chest; ⑤ The Defendant scamed the victim by making the victim talk about the department room of this case, and, in particular, the Defendant stated in the investigative agency that “the victim was 3 times after the victim transferred to the toilet, i.e., the victim was scambling, immediately after the injury,” and the Defendant scaming the victim into the room in this case.

Therefore, the defendant had the criminal intent of indecent act by compulsion at the time of committing the crime of injury in this case.

Nevertheless, the lower court rendered a not guilty verdict on the “the injury caused by indecent act by indecent act after entering a residence” among the facts charged in the instant case by deeming that the Defendant did not have the intent to commit the crime of indecent act by indecent act at the time of committing the crime of injury, and the injury of the victim was issued in the course of following the Defendant’s residence intrusion. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the

B. Two years and six months of imprisonment sentenced by the lower court, and four years of suspension of execution.