The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to whether each of the instant lands was owned by C at the time of distributing farmland

(a) On December 31, 1975, the name is written in the column of ownership on the old land ledger restored before the amendment of the Cadastral Act;

Even if the statement does not recognize the presumption of right.

In addition, even if documents prepared in the course of farmland distribution under the former Farmland Reform Act (amended by Act No. 31 of Jun. 21, 1949, which was repealed by Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994; hereinafter the same shall apply) are registered as a prop or person being compensated, the person is not presumed to be the owner of the farmland subject to distribution.

Therefore, even if a person who is not a person in the name of the land is registered as the owner in the old land ledger or the part of the distributed farmland register, it cannot be presumed that such person is the owner.

However, there is no limitation to using the entries in the old land ledger or documents related to farmland distribution as data for fact finding of changes in rights by comprehensively taking into account other circumstances.

In addition, in cases where not only documents stating matters necessary for repayment such as documents confirming farmland subject to distribution, such as one farmland land list, and repayment ledger, but also documents stating the owner’s application for compensation, prop declaration, land price statement, securities, etc. prepared in the course of receiving compensation by the party who purchased the farmland from the State, such documents can be sufficiently binding evidence to acknowledge that the ownership of the land has been transferred to the person under whose name at least at the time of distributing the farmland.

In such cases, in order to reject the probative value of traceable materials as above, it shall be carefully determined by closely examining whether there are other reasonable circumstances that are contrary to the foregoing (see Supreme Court Decisions 2012Da91354, Jun. 27, 2013; 2014Da13808, Jun. 26, 2014; 201Da13808, Jun. 26, 2014).