1. All appeals filed by the plaintiffs are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The grounds alleged by the plaintiffs citing the judgment of the court of first instance are not significantly different from the allegations in the court of first instance while appealed, and the fact-finding and judgment of the court of first instance are recognized as legitimate even if all the evidence submitted in the court of first instance are collected.

Accordingly, the court's decision on this case shall correct the part concerning "Article 41 (4) 5" of the 5th 12th 5th 12 of the judgment of the court of first instance as "Article 41 (3) 5" and the judgment of the court of first instance.

3.2

Except where the part of paragraph (1) (from the last 6th to 10th 9th eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth e)

【The part used for dismissal】 As seen earlier, the person who suffered occupational accidents after the closure date is also eligible for disaster compensation benefits, the latter part of Article 41(3)4 and the latter part of Article 41(3)5 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Enforcement Decree (hereinafter “each provision of this case”) which was applied at the time of the closure of each mining establishment for which the plaintiffs worked as the plaintiffs is entitled to disaster compensation benefits. “A person whose disability grade is not determined as of the closure date regardless of the period of occurrence of disaster” is also defined as eligible for disaster compensation benefits, and the plaintiffs were diagnosed as pneumoconiosis from July 8, 2003 to April 7, 2005, respectively.

Therefore, as in the case of the plaintiffs, it is the key issue of this case whether a person who was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis after the closure date should be deemed as a person eligible for disaster compensation benefits in the interpretation of the above Enforcement Decree.

However, considering the following all the circumstances, it is reasonable to interpret the latter part of each provision of this case to the extent that “Notwithstanding the occurrence of a disaster,” “any occupational accident that occurred one year retroactively from the date of mine closure,” and also includes the case where the occupational accident occurred after the date of mine closure.