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(영문) 대법원 1966. 11. 22. 선고 66사26 판결
[소유권이전등기말소][집14(3)민,232]
Main Issues

(a) When a party appears to know any of the grounds for a retrial under Article 422(1)9 of the Civil Procedure Act;

(b) A case that does not fall under Article 422(8) of the Civil Procedure Act;

Summary of Judgment

Since there was a new farmland distribution after a final and conclusive judgment that held that farmland distribution is void as a matter of course, the distribution of the original invalid farmland cannot take effect retroactively, and such new distribution cannot be deemed to constitute a case where a final and conclusive judgment or an administrative disposition based on the judgment under paragraph (1) 8 of this Article is changed.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 422(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 426(1) of the Civil Procedure Act

Plaintiff (Reexamination Plaintiff)

Plaintiff (Reexamination Plaintiff)

Defendant (Re-Defendant)

Defendant (Re-Defendant) 1 and 12 others

original decision

Supreme Court

Text

The action for retrial shall be dismissed.

Costs of retrial shall be borne by the plaintiff.

Reasons

1. The plaintiff's reasons for retrial are as follows:

The land in this case is not self-fluored, but it is purchased to the state as a matter of course at the time of the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act and distributed to the plaintiff. Since the court below ruled that distribution to the plaintiff in the original judgment is null and void as it does not go through the prescribed procedure, the plaintiff has been distributed again through legitimate procedure in 1966.7, which is after the final and conclusive judgment, which constitutes Article 422(8) of the Civil Procedure Act, and this constitutes a lawsuit for retrial.

However, the ground alleged by the Plaintiff is that there was a new farmland distribution after the final and conclusive judgment, and the distribution of the original invalidation cannot take effect retroactively due to such new distribution. As such, the new distribution of the arguments can not be deemed to constitute a case where a judgment or administrative disposition based on Article 422(8) of the Civil Procedure Act is modified. Thus, it is clear that it does not constitute a legitimate ground for retrial.

2. The summary of the reasons for further review by the Plaintiff’s agent is as follows:

In accordance with Article 426 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act, there has been a deviation from judgment affecting the original decision, and under Article 426 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act, a lawsuit for retrial shall be filed by the parties within thirty days from the date on which the grounds for retrial are known, and under Article 422 (2) of the same Act, this period shall be fixed as a peremptory term. Thus, it shall be presumed that the parties, barring any special circumstance, have been served with the written decision, and therefore, it shall be presumed that the decision of the original court was served on April 11, 1962 by the delivery report attached to the original record. Since the date received by the original court on November 10, 1966 on the ground of the omission of the above decision, in this case without a clear explanation of special circumstances, the plaintiff is inappropriate since the plaintiff ultimately failed to comply with the peremptory term after the lapse of thirty days from the date on which the grounds for retrial was known.

3. Therefore, since all of the lawsuits for retrial are not unlawful, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices of the Supreme Court Dog-gu (Presiding Judge) Dog-Jak and Mag-gu Mag-gu

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