1. The Defendants are to each of the Plaintiffs on March 7, 2012, Daejeon District Court, Jin-si, X 128 square meters.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. On January 9, 2012, Y completed the registration of ownership transfer on the ground of sale on January 6, 2012 with respect to each of the lands listed in the separate sheet column (hereinafter “instant dominant land”).

Y On March 7, 2012, on March 7, 2012, with respect to the establishment of a traffic zone (hereinafter “instant servitude”) free of charge on the ground of a contract concluded on January 6, 2012, with respect to the land of the said two parcels of land (hereinafter “instant servient estate”) of AA forest 533 square meters and AB forest 767 square meters (hereinafter “instant plot of land”), which was owned by the Z, prior to the partition.

B. Of the instant subentent estate, from May 2, 2013 to May 2, 2013, 128 square meters of AA AA forest land at the time of the said partition (hereinafter “instant land”); and on September 2, 2016, AC forest land was divided into 315 square meters, and on September 2, 2016, from September 21, 2016 to 767 square meters of AB forest land before the said subdivision, a 725 square meters of AD forest land was divided.

C. The station of the instant case is connected to AG, which is a contribution through the land AE, AD, and AF in the Siljin-si.

The above AE land is co-owned by the owners of the dominant land in this case, and the above AD and AF land were used as an entry into and exit into the nearby apartment complex, and was donated to the city in which the road was created.

The Plaintiffs completed the registration of ownership transfer on May 9, 2013 with respect to each of 1/2 shares out of the instant land.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, entry of Gap evidence 1 to 21, purport of the whole pleadings

2. According to the facts acknowledged earlier, Y sold the dominant land of this case owned by the principal to the Z, completed the registration of establishment of the servitude of this case with respect to the dominant estate of this case, and since the servitude of this case is a free servitude without setting the duration of passage, it is reasonable to deem that the instant servitude contract was a loan for use or a similar contract (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da228,235, Mar. 26, 2009). In the context of a loan for use, even if the object is a road site, the period is sufficient for use or profit-making.