1. A donation contract concluded on August 31, 2015 with respect to the share of 1/2 of the real estate stated in the separate sheet between the defendant and B.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. B, on June 19, 2015, issued to the Plaintiff a promissory note No. 20,000,000 at par value, and on August 31, 2015, the issue date, place of payment, and place of payment of all the Promissory Notes, Incheon Metropolitan City (hereinafter “instant Promissory Notes”) and based thereon, a notary public drafted a notarial deed of promissory Notes No. 623 as a law firm name.

B. On August 31, 2015, the Defendant entered into a gift agreement with her husband B on one-half portion of the real estate (hereinafter “instant real estate”), and completed the ownership transfer registration in the Defendant’s future (hereinafter “instant ownership transfer registration”) under the receipt of No. 79952 on September 1, 2015 by the Nam-dong Registry of the Incheon District Court (hereinafter “instant gift agreement”).

C. Meanwhile, B does not have any property other than the share of 1/2 of the instant real estate.

[Reasons for Recognition] Uncontentious Facts, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 4, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport of this Court, and the head of Seo-gu Incheon Metropolitan City's fact-finding results, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination

A. According to the facts of recognition of the existence of preserved bonds, B had already issued the Promissory Notes to the Plaintiff on June 19, 2015, which was prior to the conclusion of the gift contract of this case, and the due date for payment was determined as August 31, 2015. Accordingly, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff’s claim against B constitutes a preserved claim for the obligee’s right of revocation of the Promissory Notes.

B. 1) Where an obligor donated his/her own property to another person while in excess of his/her obligation, such act constitutes a fraudulent act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da28686, May 31, 2007). 2) The fact that B did not have any property other than the instant real property share at the time of the conclusion of the instant donation contract is as seen earlier, and as such, in principle, the Defendant’s donation of the instant real estate share, which is one of his/her sole property, to the Defendant.