1. The Defendant’s KRW 54,120,00 and the Plaintiff’s annual rate of KRW 6% from January 1, 2017 to April 26, 2017, and the following.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. The Defendant was awarded a contract for loading and unloading chips within C from the Korea TJ Korea Transportation Corporation.

B. On February 15, 2016, the Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with the Defendant’s agent (hereinafter “instant lease agreement”) on the lease of KRW 12,00,000 (value-added tax separate) monthly during the said period, as claimed by the Defendant’s agent.

C. Until December 31, 2016, the Plaintiff leased the string to D, claiming the Defendant’s agent, and the rent which has not been paid until now is KRW 54,120,00 (including value-added tax).

【Reason for Recognition】 Each entry of Evidence A or 4, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The assertion and judgment

A. The plaintiff's assertion 1) The plaintiff's assertion D was referred to as the defendant's representative director F with the authority to act as an agent for the conclusion of the instant lease contract. Even if D did not have the authority to act, the plaintiff concluded the instant lease contract with the belief that D had the authority to act as a representative. Therefore, since the defendant is liable for contract liability or expression agent, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff the unpaid rent of 54,120,000 won and its delay damages. 2) The defendant's representative director F of the defendant's assertion that the defendant's internal director of the defendant's representative director F of the defendant's company cannot lead a social life without his/her mother's intention to act as a third-class disabled person, and D established the defendant by stealing the name of F.

The instant lease agreement is also concluded voluntarily by D without F’s consent.

Therefore, the plaintiff cannot respond to the plaintiff's argument.

B. Determination 1, as alleged by the Defendant, D established the Defendant by stealing the name of F and engaged in all transactions including the instant transaction in the name of the Defendant.

In light of the following circumstances, the Plaintiff believed that D had the authority to enter into the instant lease agreement on behalf of the Defendant, taking into account the overall purport of each of the above evidence.