1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

(b).

1. The reasons why this court is stated in this part of the basic facts are the same as the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance. As such, the basic facts are included in the summary thereof under the main sentence of Article 420

2. Summary of the plaintiff's assertion

A. The main point of the main claim is as follows: (a) the agreement prohibiting competition and penalty under Article 2(3) of the instant contract (hereinafter “instant provision”) is entirely null and void.

1) The instant provision excessively limits the Plaintiff’s freedom of occupation and right to work, etc. guaranteed by the Constitution, or excessively limits free competition. The instant provision is contrary to good morals and other social order as stipulated in Article 103 of the Civil Act. (2) The instant provision constitutes a standardized contract as stipulated in the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act (i.e., the Standardized Contracts Act).

At the time of the conclusion of the instant contract, the Defendant did not explain to the Plaintiff the instant provision, and the Plaintiff signed the instant contract without being aware of the content of the instant provision in the absence of mind due to the photographing of video lectures. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot assert the instant provision as the content of the contract.

(Article 3(4) and (3) of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions (Article 3(4) of the same Act). Furthermore, the instant provision provides for the period, object, etc. of which competition is prohibited excessively, and provides for the excessive amount of KRW 30 million in the event of violation as penalty for breach of this provision, which is unreasonably unfavorable to the Plaintiff who is a customer (Article 6(2)1 and (1) of the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions) or imposes unfair excessive liability for damages (Article 8 of the same Act).

B. The gist of the conjunctive claim in this case is that the Plaintiff’s lecture and the period during which the establishment of a new business is prohibited is two years after the expiration of the contract.

Even if the instant provision is not entirely null and void, prohibiting the Plaintiff from taking lectures and starting up a new business for more than one year after the expiration of the instant contract pursuant to the said provision.